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versus - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AUGUSTINE T. SMYTHE, JR.*
The largest power company, the operator of the largest merchant
marine fleet, the operator of the largest fleet of land vehicles, the
employer of the largest number of employees liable to negligence -
truly a magnificent defendant from the point of view of plaintiffs'
attorneys -such is the United States of America.
Yet until recently this fruitful field was barred to injured claim-
ants and hungry lawyers alike by the fence of sovereign immunity,
which protected the Federal Government from suits in tort. For al-
most a century, beginning with the: Court of Claims Act of 1855,1
Congress had gradually yielded to constant pressure and made the
Government subject to suit in various classes of cases. The Act of
1855 granted jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to hear cases against
the United States founded upon any law of Congress or upon any
contract, express or implied. The Tucker Act of 18872 extended
concurrent jurisdiction to federal district courts in cases not exceed-
ing $10,000.00. Later statutes authorized suits for patent infringe-
ments3 and for maritime torts. 4 Several statutes authorized adminis-
trative settlement of claims in small amounts.
5
Still there was no statute permitting suit for torts in general,
with the result that thousands of private claims bills were introduced
in Congress at every session. Yielding to the growing pressure of
this mass of work, which naturally increased tremendously with the
growth of the Federal Government and its multitudinous agencies,
as well as to a sense of fair play, which demands that an injured
citizen have redress speedier than that afforded by a private claim bill,
Congress in 1946 passed the important Federal Tort Claims Act.6
Briefly stated, the Act permits suit against the United States in
negligence cases where a private corporation would be liable, with
*B.A., 1940; L.L.B., 1947, Yale University. Member of the South Carolina Bar,
Charleston, S. C.
1. Riv. STAT. §§1049-58 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §§ 171 et. seq., 1491 et. seq. (1948).
2. 24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. §§ 791, 1331-'46, etc. (1948).
3. 36 STAT. 851 (1910), 40 STAT. 705 (1918), 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1940).
4. 41 STAT. 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1940) ; and 43 STAT. 1112 (1925),
46 U.S.C. § 781 (1940).
5. 42 STAT. 1066 (1922), 31 U.S.C. § 215 (1940); 42 STAT. 63 (1921), 5
U.S.C. § 392 (1940); 49 STAT. 1184 (1936), 31 U.S.C. § 224(b) (1940); and
many others.
6. 60 STAT. 812 (1946), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402,
2411, 2412, 2671280 (1948).
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certain specific enumerated exceptions. It grants to the federal dis-
trict courts, subject to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but
sitting without a jury, jurisdiction over all money claims, without
limit as to amount, for damage to property or for personal injury
or death, caused by a negligent or wrongful act or omission of a
Government employee acting within the scope of his employment.
Appeal lies either to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals
or, with the consent of all appellees, to the Court of Claims. Pro-
vision is also made for the administrative settlement of claims not
exceeding $1,000.00. The governing substantive law shall be that
of the place of the tort, save that neither punitive damages nor in-
terest prior to judgment are allowed. Venue lies either in the
district of the situs of the tort or of the residence of plaintiff. The
period of limitation is one year after the accrual of the cause of ac-
tion. Finally, attorneys fees may be fixed by the court and shall not
exceed twenty per cent of the amount recovered by litigation, nor
ten per cent of a settlement.
Shortly after passage of the Act it was extensively reviewed in
many of the leading Law Reviews and Journals of the country, and
comment has continued to date.7 A comprehensive annotation con-
sidering the effect of early dicisions is to be found in 1 A.L.R. (2d)
222 (1948). It is the purpose of this article not to duplicate that
literature with a comprehensive study of the Act, but to discuss one
or two of the more actively litigated points of interpretation, and
to consider one or two interesting shadows which the Act casts upon
the law of the State of South Carolina.
The principal basis of interpretation which will determine the final
scope of the Tort Claims Act is whether the United States Supreme
Court will treat it, from the point of view of the claimant, with a
generous or a niggardly hand.8 It has long been a canon of statu-
tory construction in this country that statutes permitting suit against
the Government, being in derogation of sovereign immunity, should
be strictly construed. 9 This is based on the theory that a congres-
sional intention to subject the Government to suit will not be pre-
7. 56 YALr L. J. 534 (1947) ; 7 F. R. D. 689 (1948) ; 9 F. R. D. 143 (1949) ;
48 MICHIGAN L. R. 534 (1949); 35 VIRGINIA L. R. 925 (1949); 98 UNiv. OF
PA. L. R. 603 (1950); 30 BOSToN L. 1. 275 (1950); 35 IowA L. R. 501 (1950).
8. See discussion in 9 F. R. D. 143-169.
9. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 590 (1941) ; United States v.
Michel, 282 U. S. 656, 659 (1931); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272
U. S. 675, 686 (1927).
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sumed. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recently found
that the dominant modern trend favors Governmental liability, and
has to some extent relaxed the rule of strict construction as to sta-
tutes waiving the immunity of the Government or its agencies.10
In the early opinions construing the Tort Claims Act, many of
the lower courts repeated the old maxim of strict construction,11 but
several others found in the statute a breadth of language implying
an intent on the part of Congress to deal generously with the prob-
lem of injured claimants.12 In the second opinion by the Supreme
Court construing the statute, United States v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,' 3 language is used which indicates that the Court intends
to give full play to the statute. The Court said:
"In argument before a number of District Courts and Courts
of Appeals, the Government relied upon the doctrine that sta-
tutes waiving sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.
We think that the congressional attitude in passing the Tort
Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's
statement in Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y.
140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29: 'The exemption of the sovereign
from suit involves hardship enough, where consent has been
withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of con-
struction, where consent has been announced'."
Since the Court apparently went out of its way, and beyond the
argument of counsel before it, to express its views of the congres-
sional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act, it may be safe to as-
sume that its purpose was to give notice of its overall policy toward
the statute, and that the language used should not be thought to
apply only to the particular issue in that case before the Court.
In the only other case to reach it to date, Brooks v. United States,
14
the Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether a ser-
viceman may recover under the Act for injuries not incident to his
service. While there is persuasive argument against a construction
10. Keifer & Keifer v. R. F. C., 306 U. S. 381, 391 (1939); F.H.A. v. Burr,
309 U. S. 242, 245 (1940) ; United States v. Shaw, 309 U. S. 495, 501 (1940);
Canadian Aviator Ltd. v. United States, 324 U. S. 215, 222 (1945) semble.
11. Town of Amherst v. U. S., 77 F. Supp. 80 (D.C. N.Y. 1948); Bates v.
U. S., 76 F. Supp. 57 (D.C. Neb. 1948); Spelar v. U. S., 75 F. Supp. 967
(D.C. N.Y. 1948) ; State of Md. to use of Burkhardt v. U. S., 70 F. Supp. 982
(D.C. Md. 1947).
12. Seplar v. United States, 171 F. 2d 208 (C.C.A. 2 1948); Employers'
Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 167 F. 2d 655, 657 (C.C.A. 9th 1948).
13. 70 S. Ct. 207 (1949).
14. 337 U. S. 49 (1949).
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of the Act which would permit recovery in such cases, I S the Supreme
Court made short shrift of it. The opinion of Mr. justice Murphy1 6
uses this sentence:
"We are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but
that of servicemen'."
On the basis of presently available evidence, it is probably reason-
able to assume that the Supreme Court will give full play to the
congressional intent to subject the Government to suit in tort, and
that it will be difficult to convince that Court that "any claim" means
anything other than "any claim".
After the question of general attitude toward the interpretation
of the Act, perhaps the most interesting and certainly the most liti-
,gated questions of interpretation have to do with who may be par-
ties plaintiff, and whether anyone in addition to the United States
may be a party defendant. We will consider these questions in in-
verse order.
As plaintiff's intestate was walking across a street at an inter-
section, two automobiles collided, the course of one was diverted,
,and plaintiff acquired her cause of action. She joined as parties
defendant the drivers and the owners of both cars. One was a mail
truck owned by the United States of America. 17 In another case,
plaintiff, riding in a taxicab operated by Yellow Cab Company, was
injured when the cab collided with a United States mail truck. Plain-
tiff sued the Cab Company in the federal District court, jurisdiction
being based on diversity of citizenship, and that defendant filed a
third party complaint under Rule 14 (a) seeking to enforce con-
tribution from the United States.' 8 In still another case, also involv-
ing an automobile collision, plaintiff, a passenger in the private car,
joined as defendants the driver of that car and the United States,
whose employee was driving the other vehicle. 19
The propriety of these and similar joinders has been challenged
in a number of cases, sometimes by the United States, and some-
times by the private defendant. In considering the opinions care
must be taken to differentiate between three classes of possible co-
15. Brooks v. United States, 169 F. 2d 840 (C.C.A. 4th 1948) (Parker
dissenting) ; Cf. Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Md. 1948);
74 F. Supp. 209 (D.C. Md. 1947).
16. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented.
17. Precht v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 889 (W.D. N.Y. 1949).
18. Howey v. Yellow Cab Co., 181 F. 2d 967 (C.C.A. 3d 1950).
19. Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D.C. Md. 1947).
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defendants: (a) the employee of the Government whose negligence
gave rise to the claim; (b) a joint tortfeasor who is a resident of
the same state as plaintiff; (c) a joint tortfeasor as to whom there
exists diversity of citizenship.
20
The Tort Claims Act is silent on the precise point, but several of
its provisions are pertinent. The overall scheme of the Act is to
put the United States as nearly as possible in the position of a pri-
vate defendant, with certain safeguards. There is thus nothing in
the general scheme to refute the idea of joinder. Furthermore, the
Act specifically provided that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should govern, and Rule 20 (a) authorizes joinder.2 1 On the other
hand, the Act provides that judgment shall be a complete bar to any
cause of action by plaintiff against the Government employee in-
volved, which has led some courts to isolate the case of an employee
defendant. 22 Also the Act prescribes that the case against the United
States shall be tried without a jury, which raises complications in join-
ing a defendant who has a constitutionally protected right to a jury
trial. The legislative history, contained in many hearings and com-
mittee reports, is illuminating but not decisive.
2 3
Essentially the difficulty is this: the Tort Claims Act is similar
in purpose to the Tucker Act, and makes reference to it for some
of its procedure. In United States v. Sherwood,24 the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Rules applied only to the manner of exer-
cising jurisdiction and could not be used to increase it. That action
arose under the Tucker Act which antedates the Federal Rules, and
the Court refused to allow joinder. The argument of the propo-
nents of joinder under the Tort Claims Act is that by specifically
referring to the Federal Rules in the Act itself, Congress made the
procedure prescribed by those Rules a part of the jurisdictional grant
of the Act itself.
The decisions permitting joinder, at least in the case of diversity
20. Of all the cases dealing with the question, none has been found which
permits joinder of the Government employee, or of a resident joint tortfeasor.
Nor has any case been found which reveals that a non-resident joint tortfeasor
was not allowed to be joined. Some of the opinions, however, are not clear on
this point. Cf. Drummond v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Va. 1948);
Bullock v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 445 (D.C. N.J. 1947).
21. The section of the F. T. C. A. specifying the applicability of the Federal
Rules was repealed by the Act of June 25, 1948, revising Title 28 of the United
States Code, presumably because it was considered surplusage. See Howey v.
Yellow Cab Co. See note 18, supra, at page 971 footnote 8.
22. See note 17, supra.
23. See 56 YArt L. Y. 534, 535 fn. 10, 55425 (1947); Howey v. Yellow Cab
Co. See note 18, mipra, at pages 971-2, Drummond v. United States. See
note 20, supra.
24. 312 U. S. 584 (1941), reversing Sherwood v. United States, 112 F. (2d)
587 (C.C.A. 2d 1940).
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of citizenship where the co-defendant is one other than the respon-
sible Government employee,25 slightly outnumber those which for-
bid it.20 As was pointed out by judge Chesnut of Maryland in the
first opinion to consider this question,2 7 the practical difficulties pre-
sented by joinder, as to jury trials, as to appeal, as to fixing at-
torney's fees, as to admission of evidence, etc., are not insurmount-
able, whereas joinder is very desirable in the interest of a speedy
and equitable deliverance from the afflictions of litigation. While it
may be that from a purely technical point of view the reasoning of
the cases forbidding joinder is extremely convincing, it appears to
the writer that the Supreme Court of the United States is more
likely, if and when presented with the issue for decision, to sweep
aside the technical objections and, in the mood of the Aetna and
Brooks cases,2 8 to find no objection to the joinder of third party
defendants.
A different but related question is whether a suit may be brought
under the Act by a plaintiff who is not the party originally injured,
but a subrogated insurer of the primary claimant. While this ques-
tion has been authoritatively answered in favor of the insurer-sub-
rogee by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Aetna
Casualty and Insurance Co.,29 the importance of the question merits
its review here.
The argument of the Department of Justice in seeking to avoid
such suits was in two parts:
(a) The Act declares that the district courts shall have jurisdic-
tion over "claims against the United States, for money damages
* * * for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
, , ,,"30 The Act as passed further read: "* * * The United
States shall be liable in respect of such claims to the same claimants,
in the same manner, and to the same extent as a private individual
25. Howey v. Yellow Cab Co. See note 18, supra. State of Maryland for use
of Pumphrey v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 83 F. Supp. 91 (D.C. Md. 1949,
aff'd. i part, rev'd. in part, 176 F. 2d 414 (C.C.A. 4th 1949) (appelate de-
cision does not discuss point involved here, but seems to assume propriety of
joinder); Newsum v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 225 (D.C. S.D. N.Y.
1948); Bullock v. United States. See note 20, supra. Englehardt v. United
States. See note 19, stupra.
26. Precht v. United States. See note 17, supra; Donovan v. McKenna, 80
F. Stpp. 690 (D.C. Mass. 1948); Drummond v. United States. See note 20,
supra. Uarte v. United States, 7 F. R. D. 703 (D.C. Cal. 1948).
27. See note 19, supra.
28. See notes 13 and 14, supra.
29. See note 13, supra.
30. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1948). The original Act prior to its codifica-
tion read "on account of injury" etc.
6
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* * *"31 The Government argued that a claim by a subrogated
insurer was not "on account of" injury to property, but was on ac-
count of a payment made by the insurer to the insured. It further
said that the language cited to footnote 31 above was not controlling,
even though a private individual would be responsible to a subrogated
insurer, because that language is introduced by the phrase "in re-
spect of such claims," meaning, as it was contended, claims on the
part of the person suffering the original damage.
(b) The so-called Anti-Assignment statute32 declares void the
transfer or assignment of any claim upon the United States, with
certain exceptions not here pertinent. It was the contention of
the Government that this statute applied to assignments of claims
by operation of law, as is the case with subrogation, as well as to
voluntary assignments, and that it therefore served to prevent the
bringing of an action in the name of an insurer-subrogee. Since
Rule 17(a) requires that every action shall be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest, and since the doctrine of Pringle
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.33 has not been applied to that
Rule, this would have left subrogated insurers in a position of some
difficulty.
The question was important not only because of the numberless
suits which it immediately involved, but also because of the size
of many of the claims affected by it.84 While in the long run the
issue was between the man who pays insurance premiums and the
man who pays taxes, this philosophical view was not evident among
the companies or their attorneys who early found themselves em-
broiled in the dispute. Before the issue was decided by the Supreme
Court, it had been discussed in published opinions by at least six-
teen district courts35 and by eight Courts of Appeals. 38
31. For codification see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 (1948).
32. R.S. § 3477, 31 U.S.C.A. § 203.
33. 212 S.C. 303, 47 S. R. 2d 722 (1948).
34. The Texas City disaster, as a principal example, involves an estimated
$200,000,000 of subrogated claims now being litigated.
35. Rusconi v. U. S., 74 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Calif. 1947); Old Colony Insur.
Co. v. U. S., 74 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. Ohio 1947); Hill v. U. S., 74 F. Supp.
129 (N.D. Tex. 1947); Wojcink v. U. S., 74 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Wis. 1947);
Grace v. U. S., 76 F. Supp. 174 (D. Md. 1948); Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v.
U. S., 76 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. N.Y. 1948); Insur. Co. of North America v.
U. S., 76 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Va. 1948); Van Wie v. U. S., 77 F. Supp. 22
(N.D. Iowa 1948); Town of Amherst v. U. S., 77 F. Supp. 80 (W.D. N.Y.
1948); Gray v. U. S. 77 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1948); State Road Dept. of
State of Florida v. U. S., 78 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Fla. 1948); Bewick v. U. S.,
74 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Tex. 1947); Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. U. S., 76 F.
Supp. 333 (E.D. N.Y. 1948); Cascade County, Mont. v. U. S., 75 F. Supp.
850 (D. Mont. 1948); and S. C. Highway Dept. v. U. S., 78 F. Supp. 598
(E.D. S.C. 1948).
36. See U. S. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 70 S. Ct. 207, 209 (1949).
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While some of the decisions varied, the great bulk of them antici-
pated the action of the Supreme Court in the Aetna case,37 over-
ruled the arguments of Government counsel, and permitted the ac-
tions by subrogated insurance companies. By the time the question
reached the Supreme Court, the Government had withdrawn from
its earlier positions and now argued only that the Anti-Assignment
statute was a procedural requirement preventing an insurer from in-
stituting an action in its own name, while not preventing suit and
ultimate recovery by the insurer in the name of the insured.
The Court held that the Anti-Assignment statute had for almost
a century been interpreted as forbidding only voluntary assignments
and not assignments by operation of law; that the procedural diffi-
culties foreseen by the Government- the possibility of becoming
entangled in litigation as to the respective rights of insurer and in-
sured, problems of venue due to claims by both insurer and insured
arising out of one transaction, loss of rights of counterclaim and
set-off which the Government might have against original claimants
-could largely be avoided by proper use of the Federal Rules and
by the rule that a subrogee has no better claim than that of his sub-
rogor. The Court finally held that if the Government did find itself
in the position of having to defend two or more actions on the same
tort, it would be no worse off than other tortfeasors.
In discussing the technique for bringing an action for a subrogee,
the Court held that in view of the practice under Rule 17(a), suit
should be instituted in the name of the subrogee. It said: "If the
subrogee has paid an entire loss suffered by the insured, it is the
only real party in interest and must sue in its own name". And "In
cases of partial subrogation * * * both insured and insurer 'own'
portions of the substantive right and should appear in the litigation
in their own names".
Before leaving this question of the rights of subrogees under
the Act, it is interesting to consider the parallel situation under
the present state of the law in South Carolina. The State statute
most nearly analogous to the Federal Tort Claims Act is that which
permits suit against the Highway Department in certain cases with
limited recovery. 38 The pertinent language reads as follows:
"Any person, firm or corporation who may suffer * * *
damage to his, her or its property by reason of a defect in any
37. See note 36, sitpra.
38. S. C. CoDy or LAWS, 1942, § 5887, as amended.
8
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state highway * * * may bring suit against the state highway
department * *
Insurance companies are faced with the question of whether, hav-
ing paid a claim in whole or in part for damages so caused, they
may in any way assert their subrogated rights against the Highway
Department.
This question was first put to the South Carolina Supreme Court
in a case brought in the name of the insurance company, which had
settled with the insured in full, and taken subrogation. 39 The Court
looked at the language of the statute and held that only the original
claimant might sue. The Court said:
"The Statute does not provide that an assignee of a person
who has suffered damage to his property may sue the Highway
Department. Neither is there a provision which permits a
subrogated party to enter suit for damage occasioned to the
property of the person from whom the right of subrogation
comes. The property alleged in the respondent's Complaint to
have been damaged was the property of William Foor. The
Complaint did not allege damage to any property of the respon-
dent."
This decision, as is apparent, arrives at a result, as regards sub-
rogated insurers suing the Highway Department in their own names,'
different from that reached by the Federal courts in regard to suits
under the Tort Claims Act. The South Carolina decision is ap-
parently based strictly upon the wording of the statute as quoted
above.
Since the decision in the Casualty Campany case, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court has handed down the opinion in the case of
Pringle v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.40 In that case an insur-
ance company, pursuant to its policy, had paid Pringle a part of his
loss arising out of an accident and taken subrogation. Suit was then
instituted against the Coast Line by Pringle to recover the full
amount of the loss, although in reality the insurance company would
first be reimbursed out of any recovery. This procedure was chal-
lenged. The South Carolina Court held that in such a case, where
there had been but partial payment by the insurer, it was proper for
39. United States Casualty Company v. State Highway Department, 155 S. C.
77, 151 S.E. 887 (1930).
40. See note 33, supra.
9
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the insured to sue in his own name for the full amount.41 The de-
cision uses language which suggests that the same procedure would
be deemed proper even where the insurance company had paid the
full amount of the loss.
The effect of the Pringle case upon suits against the Highway De-
partment is apparent. If the doctrine of the Pringle case is held to
include instances of full payment, then cases may be brought against
the Highway Department in the name of the insured, thus satis-
fying the language of the statute as interpreted in the Casualty Com-
pany case and denying to the Highway Department the free ride
which it has enjoyed to date in those instances in which the claim-
ant had insurance coverage. In fact-that conclusion has been
reached in Jeff Hunt Machinery Co. v. S. C. Highway Dept.42
There the plaintiff who had been paid'by the insurer was allowed to
maintain the action against the Highway Department for the damages
due to the defect in the highway (§ 5887 S. C. CoIz op LAWS 1942)
as against the contention that the plaintiff was not the real party
in interest. If this line of reasoning is followed, subrogees will be
treated alike under the two statutes, State and Federal, save that
in the former they will sue in the name of the injured party, while
in the latter they should use their own names.
There are of course innumerable other questions which may arise
under the Act, many of which are treated at length in the literature
hereinabove referred to. These will not be discussed here, but some
reference to the exceptions contained in the Act should be made.43
These are thirteen in number. The first excepts any claim arising
out of the execution of a statute or regulation, whether valid or
not, or the performance of a discretionary function, whether abused
,or not. Another class of exceptions relates to the transmission of
postal matter, the collection of customs, the administration of the
trading with the Enemy Act, the operation of the quarantine service,
or the fiscal operation of the Treasury. A third class of exceptions
covers causes of action for which a remedy has already been pro-
vided, and includes cases covered by Sections 741-752, 781-790 of
Title 46, U.S.C.A., relating to suits in admiralty, claims arising from
the operation of the Panama Canal, or of the Panama Railroad
41. Presumably the reason for attempting to keep the insurance company out
of the picture is because of a supposed preference on the part of jurors for in-
dividual rather than corporate plaintiffs.
42. Decided by South Carolina Supreme Court August 9, 1950.
43. 28 U. S. C. A. § 2680 (1948).
10
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Company, or of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Another exception
forbids claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
libel, slander, etc. There is excepted any claim arising in a for-
eign country.44 The final exception excludes claims arising out of
the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or Coast
Guard, during time of war. In a case involving construction of the
word "combatant", it was held that this covered only direct action
against an enemy, that training activities by the armed forces even
in time of war were not excepted.
45
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that the jurisdiction granted
therein shall be exclusive. 46 Yet justifiable claims may arise for
which no remedy is provided by the Statute, either because the claim
arises under one of the exceptions (especially the first exception),
or because of some hole in the draftsmanship not now apparent. Is
the claimant without a remedy?
The Tort Claims Act was passed as a part of the Legislative Re-
organization Act of 1946, and is Title IV thereof.47 In Title I,
Part 3, Section 131, it is provided, inter alia, as follows:
"No private bill or resolution * * * authorizing or directing
(1) the payment of money for property damages, for personal
injuries or death for which suit may be instituted under the
Federal Tort Claims Act * * * shall be received or considered
in either the Senate or the House of Representatives." (Em-
phasis added.)
When the Legislative Reorganization Act, S. 2177, first passed
the Senate, the words italicized above were not found in this sec-
tion. They were added in the House substitute measure. In discus-
sing the final version in debate on the floor of the House, Mr. Mon-
roney, vice-chairman of the Joint Committee, said: "* * * There
will be no claims blocked. Either they have a right to come before
the Congress or they can go into the courts".
48
It thus appears that in a proper case resort may still be had to a
private claim bill.
44. This is due presumably to the provision that the law of the place of the
occurrence shall govern. There has been considerable litigation as to the status
of American bases in such places as Newfoundland, as to islands such as Guam,
etc. See 1 A.L.R. 2d 222, 229-'30.
45. Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. (D.C. La. 1947).
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346 (b) (1948).
47. Pub. Law No. 601, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., Chap. 753 (Aug. 2, 1946).
48. 92 CONG. Rrc., July 25, 1946 at p. 10091.
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CONCLUSION
The only justification for the continued application of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity is the practical consideration of the dif-
ficulties and dangers incident to administering claims, once the doc-
trine is abandoned. Theoretically at least the taxpayers of the State
of South Carolina should pay for the damages and injuries done
in the course of administering the affairs of the State, as is the
case with any other employer, and the hardship of the State's acci-
dents should not fall upon the hapless and unoffending citizen who
happens, either in person or property, to be in the wrong place at
the wrong time.
The Federal Tort Claims Act is a bold and proper piece of legisla-
tion. A similar step on the part of this State would be only the
assumption of a burden rightfully hers. Perhaps local conditions
would demand additional safeguards not found in the Federal Act.
These could be devised. The duty of the State to live within the
laws which she prescribes for others should be recognized and as-
sumed.
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